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ABSTRACT
MEASURING CENTRAL BANK CREDIBILITY FROM THE EFFECT OF
INFLATION SHOCKS ON ASSET PRICES
JUNMEI XU
2017
In the early 1990s, the Bank of Canada explicitly adopted the inflation-targeting
framework for monetary policy, while the Federal Reserve did not; instead, the Fed
settled on an implicit inflation-targeting framework. In this study, I test whether the Bank
of Canada and the Federal Reserve earned credibility for their respective commitments—
explicit or otherwise—to maintain low and stable inflation. I model how credibility
shapes the responses of asset prices to inflation shocks. And, for each country, I estimate
responses of commodity and foreign exchange prices to announcements of inflation
shocks during the periods of 1982 to 1991 (pre-inflation targeting period) and 1996 to
2005 (inflation-targeting period). I conclude that for Canada in the period 1996 to 2005,
but not before, the Bank of Canada’s commitment to maintain low and stable inflation
was credible. For the US, the credibility of the Federal Reserve seems to have grown as
well, though to a lesser extent relative to the Bank of Canada. Taken together, my results
indicate that the Bank of Canada in the period1996 to 2005 is most credible, both relative
to its own past and to the Federal Reserve.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades (1990-2010), inflation targeting as a framework for
monetary policy has been widely adopted by central banks. The framework plays an
increasingly important role in the development of monetary policy throughout the world.
In an inflation-targeting framework, a central bank announces official numerical targets
or target ranges for the inflation rate over one or more time horizons and specifies that
achieving a low and stable inflation rate is the primary long-run goal of monetary policy.
By establishing numerical objectives to be met over a specified period, the inflationtargeting framework holds central bankers accountable and, thus, encourages frequent
communication between inflation-targeting central banks and the public. Additionally,
frequent communication increases the transparency of monetary policy. The explicit
numerical objectives and the transparency of inflation targeting policy together make
monitoring inflation targeting easier for the public and help the inflation targeting central
banks build credibility.
In this study, I test and compare central bank credibility for low and stable
inflation of two central banks—namely, the Bank of Canada and the Federal Reserve
System over the period of 1980 to 2005. In the early 1990s, the Bank of Canada publicly
transitioned adopted in inflation-targeting framework for monetary policy; meanwhile,
the Federal Reserve did not. This change at the Bank of Canada relative to itself and the
Federal Reserve allows me to evaluate the effects of different monetary policies on
central bank credibility for low and stable inflation.
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Central bank credibility has become a focal point in the contemporary literature
on monetary policy, where credibility is commonly defined as the ability of the central
bank to manage inflation expectations of economic agents. Specifically, if a central bank
were to achieve credibility, economic agents would be less likely to adjust their
expectations of inflation upward in response to a one-off inflation shock. Put differently,
inflation expectations would be anchored. In contrast, if a central bank were not to
achieve credibility, economic agents would instead interpret an inflation shock as a new,
looser monetary policy. In this case, economic agents would raise their expectations of
inflation and thereby bring about a higher inflation rate. For example, during the 1970s,
the Federal Reserve increased the federal funds rate in order to reduce inflation.
However, because it did not have credibility for maintaining low and stable inflation at
that time, the federal funds rate increases in fact led to higher inflation expectations,
because market participants deduced that an expansionary monetary policy was likely to
occur in the near future and the Federal Reserve would not maintain its inflation target.
(C. D. Romer & Romer, 2000)
In general, the greater central bank credibility is, the more convinced economic
agents are that the announced inflation target will be met and, thus, the more firmly
anchored inflation expectations are. When a central bank adopts an inflation-targeting
framework for monetary policy, it does so, in part, to build credibility. If a central bank
is credible, aggregate shocks exert their impact transitorily, and thus the central bank
anchors inflation expectations and achieves its inflation target. This is why increasing
central bank credibility is one of the objectives of inflation targeting policy.
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In the literature there are several studies that use the dynamics of long-term
inflation expectations to infer something about central bank credibility. In some of these
studies, researchers use survey data to measure inflation expectations directly; in others,
researchers use financial market data to infer the dynamics of inflation expectations
indirectly. In this study, I examine commodity-market data. Specifically, I measure the
responses of commodity prices to inflation shocks in order to identify whether inflation
expectations are relatively well anchored in Canada (where the Bank of Canada explicitly
targets inflation) and the United States (where the Federal Reserve does not explicitly
target inflation). Here, I identify the inflation shock as a supply shock that forces the
central bank to choose between inflation stability and output stability. If a central bank
(e.g. the Bank of Canada) adopts an explicit inflation-targeting framework, then when
inflation shocks occur, the central bank chooses to minimize inflation variability (at the
cost of output variability); in this case, inflation expectations will be anchored. However,
if the central bank (e.g. the Federal Reserve) does not adopt an explicit inflation-targeting
framework, the central bank could more easily choose to minimize output variability (at
the cost of inflation variability); in this case, inflation expectations will not be anchored.
Because commodity prices are relatively flexible, I use them as an indicator of the
commodity market’s perception of central bank credibility. Unlike most goods prices,
which are sticky in the short run and can only reflect looseness or tightness of monetary
policy in the long run, commodity prices adjust immediately in response to aggregate
shocks. And, importantly, commodity prices respond differently according to whether or
not the market perceives the central bank as a credible inflation fighter. Therefore, the
response of commodity prices to inflation shocks can be used to determine whether
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inflation expectations are anchored or not; anchored expectations reflect central bank
credibility.
In summary, in this thesis, I estimate central bank credibility under alternative
monetary policy frameworks: namely, inflation targeting and non-inflation targeting. I
focus on Canada, which adopted an explicit IT framework, and the U.S., which did not
(during my sample period). In February 1991, the Bank of Canada announced its inflation
target, aiming to reduce the inflation from the 5 to 6 percent level to around a 2 percent
level by 1995. Before that, by the fourth quarter of 1990, the inflation rate had reached
4.2 percent from a high of 5.5 percent in early 1989 (Figure 1). In addition, the Canadian
economy was in recession in 1990, when inflation pressures lessened somewhat. By
1993, inflation actually undershot the target range and maintained the level below or
close to 2 percent since then, as shown in Figure 1 (Bernanke et al., 1999).
Figure 1: Unemployment, inflation and interest rates in Canada, 1972-2005
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5
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve did not adopt an inflation-targeting framework,
at least not explicitly. Rather, the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve was informed
by a dual mandate to maintain both high employment and low and stable inflation. In the
event, in the 1990s, inflation in the US was around 3 percent (Figure 2), slightly higher
than that in Canada. And, the unemployment rate peaked at around 7.6 percent in 1992
and then dropped to below 6 percent after 1994 (Figure 2), which was much lower than
that in Canada at that time. By 1998, the unemployment rate in the US was
approximately half of that in Canada (Goodfiriend, 2005).
Figure 2: Unemployment, inflation and interest rates in the U.S., 1972-2005
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In summary, because of its explicit adoption of an inflation-targeting framework,
the Bank of Canada announced numerical targets for inflation and adopted a more
transparent policy that, to this day, entails fairly detailed communication with the public.
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Thus, I hypothesize that the Bank of Canada is credibly committed to its inflation target.
In contrast, the monetary policy for the United States was not transparent and
communication between the Federal Reserve and the public was relatively poor. Since
the 1990s, the Fed seems to have settled on an implicit inflation-targeting framework for
its monetary policy. Presumably, because the framework is implicit, it lacks transparency
and is less communicative than the Canadian framework. Thus, I estimate whether the
explicit adoption of an inflation-targeting framework afforded the Bank of Canada
credibility, and whether the Federal Reserve lacks such credibility.
The working hypothesis of this study is that the central bank that adopted an
explicit inflation-targeting framework achieved a relatively high degree of credibility
both relative to its own past and to the comparable central bank that did not adopt an
explicit inflation-targeting framework. Specifically, my working hypothesis is that the
Bank of Canada is, in the inflation-targeting period, the more credible of the two central
banks. To test this working hypothesis I pursue four objectives. The first objective is to
demonstrate how changes of commodity prices reflect the market’s expectations of
inflation. To achieve the first objective, I explore a relationship between commodity
prices and interest rates. This relationship reveals how real commodity prices respond to
changes in interest. The second objective is to demonstrate how credible and non-credible
central banks adjust the policy instrument (interest rate) in response to inflation shocks.
To achieve the second objective, I specify a macroeconomic model in which central-bank
preferences inform a Taylor-rule specification that ultimately relates news of inflation
shocks to the real interest rate. The third objective is to model how the central bank
policy framework—inflation targeting or otherwise—determines the market’s
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perceptions about the stance of monetary policy. To achieve the third objective, I use an
optimal policy rule to explore how the central bank policy framework determines its
credibility for low and stable inflation. The fourth objective is to use an event-study
approach to estimate how commodity and foreign exchange prices respond to inflation
announcements. Based on my model, if the central bank’s commitment to low and stable
inflation is credible, commodity and foreign exchange prices should respond negatively
to inflation announcements.
This paper consists of five chapters including this introduction. This first chapter
introduces the purpose of this study and show how the study is proposed. This chapter
also provides the central hypothesis and objectives to conduct the study. The second
chapter reviews the extant literature relevant to this study. The third chapter provides the
research design and empirical models that I use to analyze my central hypothesis. This
chapter also includes the definitions and descriptions of the data I use for this study. The
fourth chapter provides the analysis of the data and reports the empirical results. This
chapter also provides many of the tables and figures needed to describe the results.
Finally, the fifth chapter provides the conclusions from the study.

8
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Many studies examine the effects of aggregate shocks on commodity prices.
Aggregate shocks include monetary policy shocks in the forms of, say, money supply
surprises in 1980s (Frankel & Hardouvelis, 1985) and federal funds rates target shocks in
the 1990s (Gospodinov & Jamali, 2013). Aggregate shocks also include supply shocks,
which force central banks to choose between low and stable inflation and sustained
output growth, because such shocks move inflation and output in opposite directions. In
contrast, demand shocks move inflation and output in the same direction and, thus, do not
force central banks to choose between inflation and output objectives (Cecchetti et al.,
2002).
Aggregate shocks can affect commodity prices by changing expected real interest
rates or expected inflation. Whether the shock changes real interest rates or expected
inflation depends on the market’s perception of the stance of monetary policy. If a central
bank is perceived as credibly committed to low and stable inflation, then the market will
regard the inflationary effects of a supply shock as transitory, because the market reasons
that the central bank will reverse these effects. In this case, expected real interest rates
rise while inflation expectations remain unchanged (or anchored). However, if a central
bank is not credibly committed to low and stable inflation, then the market will regard the
inflation effects of a supply shock as permanent, because the market reasons that the
central bank will not reverse these effects. In this case, expected real interest rates do not
rise because nominal interest rate rise only one-for-one with expectations of inflation.
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In a seminal article, Frankel (1985) proposed that commodity prices should be
studied as an important indicator of inflationary expectations, because, in response to
aggregate shocks, commodity prices adjust faster than the (relatively sluggish) prices of
manufactured goods and services. As early as the 1970s, Okun (1975) argued all goods
could be divided into two sectors: customer goods and auction goods. Following Okun,
Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) renamed these two sectors manufactured goods (and
services) and basic commodities (or agricultural and mineral commodities), and assumed
the key distinction between these two sectors was that the former are differentiated
products traded in imperfectly competitive markets, so their prices are sticky in the short
run; meanwhile, the latter are homogenous products traded in perfectly competitive
markets, thus their prices are flexible and, thus, adjust instantaneously to aggregate
shocks. According to this assumption, any effects of monetary policy announcements on
commodity prices likely occur shortly after the announcement.
Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) and Frankel (1986) emphasize the important role
of expectations in the price formation process when money supply shocks occur; this
research reflects the emphasis at that time that policymakers and researches placed on the
monetary aggregates. In particular, suppose the Federal Reserve Board announced an
unintended increase in the growth rate of the money supply. If the market perceived this
increase as an indication that the Fed would maintain this higher growth rate, the market
would revise its expectations of inflation upward. Consequently, commodity prices would
rise, as investors shifted out of money and into commodities. In contrast, if the market
perceived this increase as an indication that the Fed would contract the money supply and
thus reverse the effects of the shock, the market would not revise its expectations of
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inflation. However, the market would expect a rise in the real interest rate. Consequently,
commodity prices would fall.
Thorbecke and Zhang (2009) find that in the 1970s and after 1989, federal funds
rate target increases raised and lowered gold and silver prices, respectively. They
attributed these inverse responses of gold and silver prices to the fund rate increases in
the two different periods to different inflation expectations. In particular, they argue that
responses of market participants to the increase of the federal funds rate depend on how
these participants interpret the Fed’s credibility. For the period of the 1970s, Thorbecke
and Zhang (2009) agree with C. D. Romer and Romer (2000) that the Federal Reserve
had private information about future inflation and thus the market would rely only on the
Fed’s forecasts. When the federal funds rate increased, market participants would infer
that an expansionary monetary policy was likely to occur in the near future because they
thought the Federal Reserve would not hit its target, and therefore they revised their
inflation expectations upward. Thus, in the 1970s, federal funds rate increases led to
higher inflation expectations, which in turn raised commodity prices. Whereas, for the
period after 1989, the authors agree with Gurkaynak et al. (2003) that surprise increases
in the federal funds rate target raised (short-term) real interest rates and lowered future
inflation expectations because the Federal Reserve had earned more credibility than it had
in the 1970s. This is to say, faced with an increase in the federal funds rate, market
participants believed in the Fed’s inflation-fighting credibility; thus, they revised their
inflation expectations lower. High interest rates led to higher real interest rates and lower
inflation expectations. Both of these responses worked to lower commodity prices.
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To sum up, the effect of federal funds rate increases on expected inflation may
have varied over time; and the effect has depended on the Fed’s credibility in fighting
inflation. When, in the 1970s, the Fed’s anti-inflationary policies were not credible, longterm expected inflation increased, which in turn drove up commodity prices. When, in the
1990s, the Fed’s policies were credible, long-term expected inflation fell (because real
interest rates rose), which in turn drove down commodity prices.
According to Bernanke et al. (1999), central bank credibility in financial markets
depends on delivering low and stable inflation. Inflation in the U.S. in the 1970s was high
and volatile, while inflation since 1990 has been less volatile. Bernanke argues that the
Fed’s credibility was much weaker in the 1970s than since the 1990s; this argument is
consistent with the conclusion of Thorbecke and Zhang (2009): in response to the federal
funds rate increases, gold and silver prices rose during 1970s because of the Fed’s poor
credibility, which raised the expectations of inflation; whereas gold and silver prices fell
after the1990s because of the Fed’s higher credibility, which raised real interest rates.
Similarly, there are central-bank credibility studies based on the oil-price surges
in the 1970s. Authors of these studies attribute high oil prices to high inflation
expectations. For example, Barsky and Kilian (2002) argue that in the 1970s oil prices
tended to rise because loose monetary policy resulted in higher expectations of inflation.
The higher inflation expectations in the 1970s seem to be consistent with Bernanke’s
argument that inflation in the U.S. in the 1970s was high and volatile because the Federal
Reserve lacked credibility in 1970s, so that inflation expectations would rise when supply
shocks occurred (Bernanke et al., 1999). Similarly, Anzuini et al. (2010) examine the
effect of monetary policy shocks on commodity prices, and also focus on the case of oil
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to explore the channel through which monetary policy shocks influence commodity
prices. The authors present empirical evidence suggesting that monetary policy shocks
affect commodity prices mainly through market participants’ higher expectations of
inflation.
Cornell and French (1986) gauge the responses of real interest rates and expected
inflation to surprises in the weekly money supply announcements between October 6,
1977 and March 23, 1984. They find that expected inflation, as opposed to expected real
interest rates, rose when the money supply rose unexpectedly. Armesto and Gavin (2005)
also estimate the commodity futures market’s reaction to surprises in the Fed’s interest
rate target. They show that during 1988-2001, short-term expected inflation responded
positively and significantly to surprises in the federal funds rate target, whereas real
interest rates did not respond to federal funds rate surprises.
The above literature emphasizes how increases in the federal funds rate target
raise commodity prices by increasing the market’s inflation expectations. When the Fed
does not credibility commit to low and stable inflation, changes in the federal funds rate
translate into changes in inflation expectations. In comparison, when the Fed credibly
commits to low and stable inflation, changes in the federal funds rate translate into
changes in the real interest rate. Under this situation, for example, a decrease in the
federal funds rate lowers the real interest rate and, thereby, leads to higher commodity
prices.
Frankel (2006) demonstrates how changes in interest rates affect commodity
prices through three channels: namely, inventories, speculation, and the incentive for
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extracting commodities. More specifically, low interest rates reduce firms’ opportunity
costs of carrying inventories and thereby increase firms’ demand for storable
commodities. Additionally, low interest rates entice speculators to sell interest-earning
financial assets and buy commodities because financial assets become less attractive
when interest rates are low. Finally, low interest rates create a disincentive to extract
exhaustible commodities today because of the decreased opportunity cost of delaying
extraction.
Based on the above channels, Frankel (2006) provides empirical evidence of a
negative relationship between real commodity prices and real interest rates. He relates
surges in commodity prices to looser Federal Reserve monetary policy, and concludes
that reductions in interest rates could increase commodity prices by decreasing the real
interest rate. In his work he emphasizes an overshooting model and attributes the rise in
commodity prices to market responses to monetary policy surprises. Similarly, Taylor
(2009) presents a monetary explanation for the peaks in commodity prices. He argues that
oil prices increased in 2007 and 2008 because the Federal Open Market Committee
reduced interest rates, which caused the real interest rate to fall.
Gospodinov and Jamali (2013) test how federal funds rate shocks affect
individual commodity prices for the metals and energy groups as well as commodity
price indexes in the period of 1990 to 2009. Based on several empirical tests, the authors
find that surprise decreases in the federal funds rate tend to increase individual and
aggregate commodity prices. They also find that the decrease in the federal funds rate
raises both nominal and real prices of commodities. These, together, seem to suggest that
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in the period of 1990 to 2009, the decrease in the federal funds rate affected commodity
prices through a decrease in the real interest rate. This is consistent with Frankel (2006).
Despite the vast literature on the effect of money supply announcements or
federal funds rate target changes on commodity prices, there is little work on the effect of
inflation (or price) shocks on commodity prices. The current norm in monetary policy is
the inflation-targeting framework. So studying how commodity prices respond to
inflation shocks under an inflation-targeting framework is sensible.
Bernanke et al. (1999) describe inflation-targeting frameworks and identify
important reasons for adopting these frameworks. The authors state that in an inflation
targeting framework, a central bank announces numerical targets for inflation and
specifies that controlling inflation is a long-run goal of monetary policy. Another
common feature is a specific policy for bringing inflation back to target in circumstances
where the central bank has missed the target. Also, inflation-targeting central banks often
adopt a relatively transparent policy approach that entails fairly detailed communication
with the public.
Bernanke et al. (1999) also discuss the framework of the Bank of Canada’s
inflation targeting process and show how, when, and why the Bank of Canada adopted its
targets. The authors explain that John Crow, the governor of the Bank of Canada in 1988,
made it clear that the long-run monetary policy objective for the Bank of Canada should
be price stability, which central bankers generally define as low and stable inflation.
After substantial progress in reducing the inflation rate was already evident, the Bank of
Canada announced, in February 1991, its inflation-targeting framework. Since then,
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several countries have adopted inflation targeting, and no country has abandoned it. A
noted exception to this group is the United States, where the framework for monetary
policy is informed by a dual mandate to maintain both high employment and low and
stable inflation. However, inflation targeting has many advocates in the United States.
Those advocates argue that the economy could benefit from an inflation-targeting
framework, which ensures low and stable inflation by enhancing central bank credibility.
This enhanced credibility affords the central bank flexibility to stabilize the real
economy. In any case, by the late 1990s, the United States seemed to settle on an implicit
inflation-targeting framework for monetary policy (Goodfiriend, 2005).
Modern central banks set—explicitly or implicitly—inflation targets and follow
interest-rate rules with the aim of achieving these targets. In order to achieve a medium
term target of inflation or some combination of inflation and real economy activity
targets, central banks adjust a near-term policy instrument, such as the short-term interest
rate, in response to inflation shocks. This adjustment in general follows some specific
monetary policy rules. For example, Taylor (1999) analyzed interest rate rules that
describe how the Federal Reserve adjusts the federal funds rate in response to the state of
the economy. When there is an inflation shock, such that the actual inflation rate exceeds
the target inflation rate, according to Taylor, in order to keep its inflation target, the
Federal Reserve tightens monetary policy; this tightening should raise the federal funds
rate by more than one-for-one with the increase in the inflation rate. This is to say, Taylor
(1993) argues monetary policy should move the interest rate in the same direction and by
a greater amount than observed movements in inflation—this is called the Taylor
principle. By following the Taylor principle, inflation reverts to its equilibrium (target-
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value) quickly. That is, in response to inflation shocks central banks increase the nominal
interest rate more than one for one with the rise in the inflation rate. Thus, the rise in the
nominal interest rate corresponds to a rise in the real interest rate. The resulting comovements between inflation and the real interest rate render inflation shocks transitory.
An inflation shock is a supply shock. Supply shocks force the central bank to
choose to minimize either inflation or output variability. In other words, in response to a
supply shock, minimizing inflation variability is costly in terms of output variability.
Cecchetti et al. (2002) demonstrate how aggregate supply shocks force a central bank to
implement monetary policy according to its preferences regarding inflation and output
variability. In particular, by modeling dynamic relationships between output, inflation,
and the short-term interest rate, the authors demonstrate how the central bank adjusts its
policy instrument (short-term interest rate) to achieve an optimal combination of low and
stable inflation and sustained economic growth.
In the inflation-targeting framework, in response to a supply shock, a central bank
must choose to minimize inflation variability if it is credibly committed to its inflation
target. When a central bank chooses to minimize inflation variability, it follows the
Taylor principle to raise the real interest rate in response to a positive inflation shock.
In summary, a central bank’s policy framework—inflation targeting or
otherwise—is informed by the central bank’s preference regarding inflation and output
variability, which in turn determines whether the Taylor principle holds. As the literature
I have reviewed here reveals, although the effects of monetary supply shocks on
commodity prices have been widely studied, the effect of aggregate supply shocks,
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particularly inflation shocks, remains largely unexplored. As I demonstrate in a model I
propose in chapter 3, how inflation shocks affect commodity prices reveals the extent of
central bank credibility and, thus, the effectiveness of a given monetary policy
framework—inflation-targeting or otherwise.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND DATA
In this chapter, I present how this study is designed. At the beginning of this
chapter, I introduce the theoretical background on which the estimation model is based.
Then I specify how I structure empirical models that are used to test the working
hypothesis of this study. Finally, I provide definitions and descriptions of the data I use in
this study. In the appendix, I present detailed derivations associated with the model and
additional tables associated with the data.
3.1 Background
Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) test the credibility of the Federal Reserve
regarding its commitment to money growth targets through the reactions of commodity
prices to money supply announcements. Following Okun (1975), the authors emphasize
that commodity prices, unlike most manufactured goods prices that are sticky in the short
run, adjust quickly—“even from minute to minute” (Frankel & Hardouvelis, 1985)—in
response to monetary policy shocks. Thus, because commodity prices are flexible, they
should clearly indicate how inflation expectations respond to money supply shocks. If
market participants expect higher money supply growth, and consequently higher
inflation, they will shift out of money and into commodities, thus driving up commodity
prices; in this case, central bank credibility (as an inflation fighter) is low. In contrast, if
market participants expect lower money supply growth, and consequently lower inflation,
they will shift into money and out of commodities, thus driving down commodity prices;
in this case, central bank credibility is high (Frankel & Hardouvelis, 1985). In other
words, commodity prices are positively related to inflation expectations, which reflect
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central bank credibility. For this reason, Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) propose to test
central bank credibility through the reactions of commodity prices to news of monetary
policy shocks in the form of unexpected changes in the money supply. Specifically, when
an unexpected increase in the money supply is announced, and market participants
believe the central bank is committed to its monetary target, they expect the central bank
to counteract this increase—and, thus, tighten the money supply by raising the nominal
interest rate—in the near future. Because the nominal interest rate equals the real interest
rate plus expected inflation (money growth rate), market participants’ expectations of
tightening monetary conditions cause the real interest rate to rise as well. The higher real
interest rate leads market participants to shift into interest-earning financial assets and out
of commodities, driving down commodity prices. In contrast, if market participants do
not believe the central bank is committed to its monetary target, they do not expect the
central bank to counteract the unexpected increase in the money supply. Rather, they
regard the unexpected increase in the money supply as an indicator of the central bank’s
new, looser monetary policy; thus, participants revise their inflation expectations upward.
They shift out of interest-earning financial assets and into commodities, driving up
commodity prices.
In summary, the public’s expectations of inflation for the near future are related to
the central bank’s credibility, and these expectations are revealed in the behavior of
commodity prices. Following news of a positive monetary policy shock, the real interest
rate rises and inflation expectations do not change if central bank monetary policy is
credibly committed to low and stable inflation; whereas, the real interest rate does not
change and inflation expectations rise if policy is not credibly committed. Although the
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nominal interest rate rises in both cases, commodity prices respond unambiguously:
commodity prices fall if the central bank is credibly committed and rise otherwise.
Following the seminal work of Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985), I design this
study to test central bank credibility at the Bank of Canada and the Federal Reserve
under alternative monetary policy regimes; I do so by testing the reactions of commodity
and foreign exchange prices to inflation shocks. Unlike the money supply shocks studied
by Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985), inflation shocks are supply shocks. In the context of
monetary policy, supply shocks differ from demand shocks in one key respect: demand
shocks move inflation and output in the same direction, whereas supply shocks force
policymakers to choose to minimize either inflation or output variability. In other words,
in response to a supply shock, minimizing inflation variability is costly in terms of output
variability.
In my study, I focus on the effect of inflation shocks, because modern central
banks do not target the money supply; rather, most target some combination of inflation
and real economic activity. Therefore, rather than following the specific approach that
Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) take, I develop my own model to estimate how inflation
shocks affect commodity and foreign exchange prices. In particular, the model
demonstrates conditions under which commodity and foreign exchange prices will fall in
response to a rise in the real interest rate. As I explain below, this relationship between
asset prices and inflation shocks can reveal whether expected inflation is well anchored
under an inflation-targeting policy relative to some other monetary policy framework.
First I explore how real commodity prices are related to real interest rates by using the
same approach as Frankel (2006). Then, based on a macroeconomic model, I investigate
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how news of inflation shocks affects real interest rates, which in turn affect commodity
and foreign exchange prices.
3.2 Empirical Model
3.2.1 Real Interest Rates and Real Commodity Prices
To test whether market expectations of inflation are anchored, I explore a
relationship between commodity prices and interest rates by following Frankel (2006),
who takes the relationship from Dornbusch (1976), who models the relationship between
foreign-exchange prices and interest rates. As in Dornbusch (1976), I first reproduce the
essential features of this relationship for a small, open economy with perfect capital
mobility. In this case, if the domestic currency is expected to depreciate, the domestic
interest rate on asset, i, must equal to the foreign interest rate, i * , plus the expected rate
of depreciation of the domestic currency, x , which is specified in Equation 1.
i = i* + x

(1)

In addition, the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency, x , is proportional
to the difference between the log of the current exchange rate, e , and the log of the longrun exchange rate, e , which is specified in Equation 2, where θ > 0 .

x = −θ (e − e)

(2)

Substituting Equation 2 into Equation 1 yields Equation 3.

e−e = −

1

θ

(i − i * )

(3)

22
According to Equation 3, the difference between current and long-run exchange rates is
inversely proportional to the difference between domestic and foreign interest rates. That
is, a higher domestic interest rate relative to the foreign interest rate will appreciate the
domestic currency, so the domestic currency price of foreign exchange falls below its
long-run equilibrium value until the expected depreciation of the domestic currency
exactly offsets the increase in domestic interest rate. Thus, the current exchange rate,
defined here as the domestic currency price of a foreign currency—that is, units of
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency—is inversely proportional to the domestic
interest rate.
Based on Dornbusch (1976), Frankel (2006) argues that commodity prices also
overshoot in response to monetary policy shocks because commodities, like foreign
exchange, are flexible-price goods in both the short and long run. Thus, Frankel (2006)
substitutes commodity prices for exchange rates and the convenience yield for the foreign
interest rate as specified in Equation 4; here, the domestic interest, i, equals a
convenience yield, c , which I assume is constant, plus the expected change in the
commodity price, s t 1.

it = c + Et ∆st

(4)

Next, I assume regardless of how the real commodity price departs from its longrun value in response to a supply shock, the price will return to its long-run equilibrium
value according to market participants’ rational expectations. As specified in Equation 5,

c is comprised of the convenience yield, which reflects the benefits of holding
commodity inventories minus storage costs and a risk premium for carrying commodity
inventories.

1
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the expected change in the real commodity price, Et ∆(st − pt ) , is proportional to the
difference between the log of the current real commodity price, qt , and the log of the
long-run real commodity price, q , where q = s − p , and p is the aggregate price level.
Ε t [∆ ( st − pt )] ≡ Ε[ ∆qt ] = −θ ( qt − q )

(5)

Combining Equation 4 and 5, by eliminating Et ∆st and writing ∆pt as π t +1 , yields
Equation 6.

qt − q = −

1

θ

(it − E t π t +1 − c )

(6)

In Equation 6, the left side is the real commodity price, which is measured relative to its
long run equilibrium value, and the right side is the real interest rate, which is measured
relative to the convenience yield. According to Equation 6, the real commodity price, qt ,
is inversely proportional to the real interest rate, it − Etπ t +1 .
Following Equation 6, and for the sake of demonstration, I test the relationship
between real interest rates and real commodity prices over the period of 1972 to 2005 for
Canada and the U.S. I use data of monthly long-term interest rates, the core Consumer
Price Index (CPI), commodity price indexes and producer-price indexes for all
commodities. I obtain the monthly long-term interest rate and core CPI from OECD
Main Economic Indicators (OECD-MEI) for both Canada and the United States. I
compute the monthly inflation rate from the monthly core CPI, which excludes volatile
food and energy sectors. I obtain the monthly data on commodity price indexes for
Canada from the Bank of Canada. Because the U.S. commodity price index is
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unavailable, I use the producer price index for all commodities instead. I obtain the
producer price index-commodities from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
To test this relationship, I regress real commodity prices on real interest rates. To
compute real commodity prices, I take the log of the monthly commodity price index
minus the log of the monthly core CPI. To compute real interest rates, I use Equation 7.
r j = i j − [ln( CPI j ) − ln( CPI j −12 )] * 100
(7 )

Where, rj is the real interest rate, i j is the monthly long-term interest rate, j stands for the
month, and [ln( CPI j ) − ln( CPI j −12 )] * 100 is the monthly inflation rate calculated as the
same-month percentage change in the core CPI.
After I get real commodity prices and real interest rates, I use OLS to estimate the
relationship between the two datasets. The results are shown in Figures 3 and 4 for
Canada and the U.S., respectively. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, real commodity prices
are negatively related to real interest rates in both Canada and the U.S. Although in
practice, this relationship may not hold precisely because many factors other than real
interest rates potentially influence commodity prices, these figures provide some
evidence that the negative relationship implied by Equation 6 (i.e., the real commodity
price, qt , is inversely proportional to the real interest rates, it − Etπ t +1 ) is empirically
valid. I report regression results in Table 1.
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Figure 3: Canadian Real Commodity Price Index vs. Real Interest Rate, monthly, 19722005
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Sources: Bank of Canada; OECD-MEI.
Figure 4: US Real Commodity Price Index2 vs. Real Interest Rate, monthly, 1972-2005
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The US commodity price index is represented by producer price index in all
commodities.
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Table 1: Regression of real commodity prices on real interest rates
Real Commodity Price Index and Real Interest Rate
Sample: 1972-2005 (408 monthly observations)
real commodity prices in log units and real interest rates in %
Country

Constant

Coefficient

t-statistic

P-value

R-squared

1.781
-0.030***
-6.55
0.000
0.096
(0.021)
(0.005)
U.S.
0.609
-0.014***
-3.61
0.000
0.031
(0.014)
(0.004)
Notes: *** indicates significance of coefficient at the 1% level
(Standard errors are given in parentheses.)
Sources: Bank of Canada; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics;
OECD-MEI.
Canada

The coefficients in Table 1 represent the percentage change in real commodity
prices due to a one-percentage point change in real interest rates. For Canada, a one
percentage point increase in real interest rates is related to a 3 percent decline in real
commodity prices. For the U.S., a one percentage point increase in real interest rates is
related to a 1.4 percent decline in real commodity prices. For both countries, real
commodity prices are negatively related to the real interest rates. The t-statistics indicate
that the negative relationships are significant at the 1 percent level for both countries. In
each case, the small R-squared together with the large t-statistic value indicate that the
real interest rate is related to real commodity prices, but, not surprisingly, little of the
variation in commodity prices is explained by variation in real interest rates. There are
many other factors in addition to real interest rates that potentially explain real
commodity prices, including weather, political vicissitudes, and so on.
Equation 6 shows that commodity prices could, in principle, reveal how market
participants perceive the stance of central bank monetary policy. This is to say, if market
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participants interpret a supply-shock induced inflation surprise as a new, looser monetary
policy that the central bank has chosen not to reverse, participants will raise their
expectations of inflation ( Etπ t +1 ), and thereby the nominal interest rate ( it ) will rise one
for one with expected inflation; consequently, the real interest rate ( it − Etπ t +1 ) will not
change and, accordingly, the real commodity price ( qt ) will not respond to the
announcement of the shock. In contrast, if market participants interpret the inflation
surprise as a one-time event that the central bank will reverse, they will expect the central
bank to raise the real interest rate ( it − Etπ t +1 ) by raising the nominal interest rate ( it )
without any change of their expectations of inflation ( Etπ t +1 ); consequently, the real
commodity price ( qt ) will fall below its long-run equilibrium until the expected rise in
the commodity price offsets the higher expected real interest rate.
In summary, the nominal interest rate could increase [decrease] because expected
inflation increases [decreases] or because the expected real interest rate increases
[decreases]. Identifying which increase [decrease] is responsible for the nominal interest
rate increase [decrease] identifies the market’s perception of the central bank’s
credibility. In other words, identifying the cause of the nominal interest rate increase—
expected inflation or the expected real interest rate—could reveal whether the central
bank has credibly anchored the public’s expectations of inflation. I hypothesize that the
Bank of Canada anchored expected inflation because the adoption of an inflationtargeting framework affords the Bank of Canada credibility, whereas, the Federal
Reserve did not anchor expected inflation to the extent that Canada did because the Fed
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did not explicitly adopt an inflation-targeting framework (during my sample period).
Next, I introduce a macroeconomic model to test this hypothesis.
3.2.2 Monetary Policy and Real Interest Rates
Based on Galí (2008) and D. Romer (2012), I specify a macroeconomic model in
which central-bank preferences inform a Taylor-rule specification that ultimately relates
news of inflation shocks to the real interest rate. To begin, I assume a household of an
infinitely lived representative agent who maximizes the objective function specified in
Equation 8, subject to the budget constraint specified in Equation 9.
∞

E0 ∑ β tU (Ct , Nt )

(8 )

Pt Ct + Dt Bt ≤ Bt −1 + Wt Nt

(9 )

t =0

Where, Ct represents the quantity consumed of the single good, and Nt represents
working hours of household members. The marginal utility of consumption U c,t , is
assumed to be positive and diminishing, while the marginal disutility of working, − Un,t , is
positive and increasing. For t=0, 1, 2……, Pt is the price of the consumption good, thus,

Pt Ct represents total consumption expenditures. Additionally, Bt represents the quantity
of one-period, nominally riskless discount bonds purchased in period t and maturing in
period t +1. Each bond pays one unit of money at maturity and its price is Dt , where
Dt ≡

1
. Lastly, Wt represents the nominal wage.
1+ i
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Utility takes the form specified in Equation 10.
1−σ

1+ϕ

C
N
U (Ct , Nt ) = t + t
1−σ 1+ ϕ

(10 )

In this case, a standard variational argument yields the Euler equation specified in
Equation 11.
 C −σ Pt 

Dt = β t Et  t +1−σ

P
C
t
+
1
t



(11)

Taking logs and linearizing the Euler equation yields Equation 12:

ln Ct = ln Ct +1 −

1

σ

ln[(1 + rt ) β ]

(12 )

To get this expression into a more tractable form, I introduce three simplifications. First, I
substitute Yt for Ct using the fact that all production is consumed. Second, for small
values of r, ln(1 + r ) ≈ r ; thus, I replace ln(1 + r ) with r . Finally, I suppress the constant
term, −

1

σ

ln β .

These changes yield a simplified new Keynesian IS curve specified in Equation 13.

yt = Et ( yt +1 ) −

1

σ

rt

This new Keynesian IS curve shows that output is inversely related to the real interest
rate in the goods market. Specifically, an increase in the real interest rate reduces the

(13)
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quantity of investment because the cost of borrowing for investment is higher. The
reduction in planned investment lowers planned expenditure, which in turn lowers output.
In addition, I assume the central bank follows the (Taylor) interest-rate rule specified in
Equation 14, where it is the nominal interest rate, which according to the Fisher effect is
specified in Equation 15.

it = aπt + byt

(14 )

it = rt + Et (π t +1 )

(15)

In Equation 14, π t and y t represent inflation and output, each relative to its long-run
equilibrium values, the logs of which are normalized to zero in this model. This interestrate rule stipulates how much the central bank should change the nominal interest rate in
response to changes in inflation and output. In particular, the rule stipulates that for each
one-percent increase in inflation, the central bank should raise the nominal interest rate
by more than one percentage point (i.e. a > 1 )—this is called the Taylor principle.
In Equation 15, rt is the real interest rate, and Et (π t +1 ) is the expected inflation rate.
Finally, I model the supply side of the economy with the Phillips curve specified in
Equation 163.

π t = Et (π t ) + λyt + ε ts

(16 )

A popular alternative to this Phillips curve is the so-called new Keynesian Phillips curve,
and a big difference in New Keynesian Phillips curve compared to the standard Phillips
curve is that it depends on expected future inflation, instead of expected current inflation,
i.e. Et (π t +1 ) instead of Et (π t ) .
3
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The Phillips curve shows that the inflation rate depends on three forces: namely, expected
inflation rate, the deviation of output from its natural level, and supply shocks.
Because I use this model to demonstrate how supply shocks ( ε ts ), which force the central
bank to choose to stabilize inflation or output, affect the real interest rate in the short run,
I further simplify the IS curve (Equation 13): I suppress the expected-output term and set

σ = 1 ; the result is Equation 17.
yt = −rt

(17 )

Additionally, I assume inflation expectations are adaptive, i.e., Et (π t ) = π t −1 . The
adaptive expectations of inflation impose the condition that disinflation is costly in terms
of output; otherwise, the central bank’s choice to mitigate inflation is not a difficult one.
Combining Equation 14, 15, and 17 by eliminating it and yt yields Equation 18, which
relates the real interest rate to the inflation rate.

rt =

a −1
πt
1+ b

(18)

Equation 18 implies that in the case where a > 1 , the Taylor principle holds. That is, in
response to an inflation shock, the real interest rate rises to cool the economy; in this
case, the nominal interest rate increases more than one for one with the inflation rate.
Moreover, in the case where a > 1, the solution for the inflation rate is specified in
Equation 19.
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k +1



1+ b
 ε t −k
π t = ∑ 
k =0  1 + b + λ (a − 1) 
∞

(19 )

Thus, the steady-state inflation rate is zero: the effects of supply shocks on inflation do
not persist when a >1.
Finally, because Equation 18 holds in every period, in Equation 20 I express the real
interest rate in terms of unanticipated inflation (i.e., the inflation shock), πt − π t−1 .

rt = rt −1 +

a −1
(π t − π t −1 )
1+ b

( 20)

Equation 20 implies that when a > 1 , the inflation shock leads the central bank to
raise the real interest rate; and this rise of the real interest rate increases along with the
magnitude of a . When a = 1 , the inflation shock does not affect the real interest rate;
rather, the unanticipated rise in inflation effectively reflects a new normal. In other
words, it is crucial to know the magnitude (relative to 1) of a in order to characterize the
credibility of the central bank. Specifically, if the central bank is credible, then a positive
inflation shock raises the real interest rate, a > 1 . The a is an interest-rate rule parameter
specified in Equation 14 and is associated with the Taylor principle. In the next section,
following Cecchetti et al. (2002), I use an optimal policy rule to explore how the central
bank policy framework—inflation targeting or otherwise—determines the magnitudes of
a.

3.2.3 The Optimal Policy Rule
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Normally, a central bank conducts monetary policy by setting a near-term policy
instrument, such as a nominal interest rate, in order to achieve over the medium term its
optimal combination of low and stable inflation and sustained economic growth. In
practice, the use of an interest rate as the main policy instrument has often taken place in
conjunction with some inflation target. In other words, policymakers set—explicitly or
implicitly—an inflation target and change interest rates with the aim of achieving such a
target. In addition, as Cecchetti et al. (2002) demonstrate, a central bank endeavors to
achieve this optimal outcome subject to the constraints imposed on it by the dynamic
structure of the economy—in particular, the dynamic relationships between output,
inflation, and the short-term interest rate.
In the context of the model I specify above, we can think of the nominal interestrate rule (Equation 14) as the solution to an optimization problem in which the central
bank minimizes Equation 21, the expected value of a loss function that is quadratic in
(log) output deviations from trend ( yt ) and inflation deviations from target ( π t ), where,
in this case, the output trend and the inflation target are both normalized to zero. Equation
22 and 23 specify the constraints imposed by the dynamic structure of the economy.

L = E[απ 2 + (1 − α ) y 2 ]

( 21)

π t = −λrt + ε t

(22)

yt = − ( rt +

1

ω

εt )

( 23)
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Here, −ω is the slope of the aggregate demand curve and λ is the slope of the
aggregate supply curve. According to Equation 22, the central bank offsets the
inflationary effect of a supply shock by raising the (real) policy instrument ( rt );
meanwhile, according to Equation 23, the central bank offsets the recessionary effect of a
supply shock by lowering the policy instrument. Thus, because a supply shock moves
inflation and output in opposite directions, the central bank must choose to minimize
either inflation or output variability. The central bank policy framework, reflected here by
the term

α in Equation 21, informs this choice. For example, when α = 1, the central bank

minimizes inflation variability, only, and disregards output variability.
In this problem, the optimal interest-rate rule (Equation 14) generally takes the
form in Equation 24, where the optimal policy instrument is a linear function of the
supply shock.

rt = zε t

( 24)

Substituting this optimal rule into Equations 22 and 23, taking the variances of output and
inflation, and plugging these variances into Equation 21 yields the loss function in terms
of z and the parameters of the model; minimizing this loss function with respect to z
yields z as a function of the slope of the aggregate demand curve ( −ω ), the slope of the
aggregate supply curve ( λ ) , and

4

Z=

αλ − (1 − α )

1

ω
αλ 2 + (1 − α )

α .4
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Thus, the solution for

α is expressed implicitly in Equation 25 in terms of the

variability of output ( σ y2 ), the variability of inflation ( σ π2 ), and the slope of the aggregate
supply curve ( λ ). In Appendix I, I derive α .

σ π2  1 − α 
=

σ y2  λα 

2

( 25)

Solving Equation 22 and 23 by eliminating rt and substituting the resulting
expression for ε t into Equation 24 yields a real-interest rate rule; thus, a and b in the
corresponding nominal interest-rate rule specified in Equation 14 take the forms specified
in Equation 26 and 27.

a = 1+

αλω − (1 − α ) 1
(1 − α ) + αλ2 ω + λ
b = λ (1 − α )

Finally, replacing

( 26)

( 27)

ω with the expression for it implied by the nominal interest-rate rule

(Equation 14) and the IS curve (Equation 17), yields Equation 28.

a =1+

λ
1

α
Equation 28 shows that as

( 28)

+ λ2 − 1

α approaches 0, a approaches 1 and the Taylor

principle does not hold. In contrast, as α approaches 1, a grows larger than 1 and the
Taylor principle holds. In this case, according to Equation 20, inflation shocks
effectively raise the real interest rate because the central bank increases the nominal
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interest rate more than one for one with the rise in the inflation rate. The resulting rise in
the real interest rate in turn renders the inflation shock transitory. The value of α
depends on the central bank’s choice; this is to say, in the face of inflation shocks, the
central bank must choose to minimize inflation variability or output variability. In an
inflation-targeting policy framework, the central bank’s commitment to maintain low and
stable inflation is credible— α approaches 1 in Equation 28.
3.2.4 Monetary Policy and Commodity Prices: A Test of Central Bank Credibility
Equations 6, 20, and 28 are the three key equations of my model. From these
equations, it is clear that real commodity and foreign exchange prices are inversely
proportional to inflation shocks if a > 1 ; in this case, agents reason the central bank is
averse to inflation and, thus, the inflation shock is a one-off event the central bank
reverses. In contrast, if agents reason the central bank is not averse to inflation, then

α

approaches 0 so that a approaches 1; the inflation shock reflects a new normal and real
commodity and foreign exchange prices are unrelated to inflation shocks. Thus, testing
the relationship between commodity and foreign exchange prices and inflation shocks is
tantamount to testing the central bank’s credibility regarding its commitment to low and
stable inflation.
To test the relationship, I conduct regression analyses in which the percentage
change in the individual commodity and foreign exchange prices are dependent variables
and the percentage change in the inflation rate (immediately after the most-recent
inflation statistic is made public) is the independent variable; thus, I estimate regressions
of the form specified in Equation 29.
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∆st = β 0 + β1∆π t + ε t

( 29)

Where, ∆st denotes changes of individual commodity and foreign exchange prices
between the opening price on the day that the government announces the new inflation
rate and the closing price one day before the announcement; ∆πt represents inflation
shocks; ε t represents all other supply shocks except news of the inflation shock. Because
this study is designed to test the immediate response (within several hours) of commodity
and foreign currency prices to announcements of inflation shocks, the news regarding
other supply disruptions is relatively unlikely to overwhelm asset-price responses to the
inflation announcement.
The sign of the coefficient, β1 , reflects central bank’s credibility. Estimates of β1
should be negative if a central bank is credible, and nonnegative if the central bank is not
credible. This is because that when an inflation shock occurs, an inflation-targeting
central bank chooses to minimize inflation variability and, thus, raises the real interest
rate. When the real interest rate rises, commodity prices and foreign-exchange prices fall
as investors shift out of commodities and into money. Therefore, I expect a negative
relationship between commodity and foreign-exchange prices and inflation shocks (
β 1 < 0 ) if the central bank is credible. Specifically, I expect the

β1 is negative for the

post-IT period for Canada because the explicit adoption of inflation targeting afforded the
Bank of Canada credibility. For the U.S., because the Federal Reserve implicitly adopted
inflation targeting in the post-IT period, I expect some estimates of

β1 to be negative, as

well; though, I expect evidence of credibility to be stronger for Bank of Canada. In
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contrast, if the central bank is not credible, investors interpret the inflation shock as a new
normal; they shift out of money and into commodity markets. Therefore, I expect a
nonnegative relationship between commodity and foreign-exchange prices and inflation
shocks ( β1 ≥ 0 ) in the period of pre-IT for both Canada and the U.S..
3.3 Definitions and Descriptions of the Data
In order to test responses of commodity and foreign exchange prices to inflation
shocks, I use the data of individual commodity futures prices, the Canada/U.S. foreign
exchange rate, the Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index (Major Currencies5), and the core
CPI. Again, because it is less volatile, I use the core CPI to measure the inflation rate and
the inflation shock. I define the inflation shock as the difference between the announced
actual inflation rate and the expected inflation rate. I assume that the public formulates its
expectation of the inflation rate in the next month based on the actual inflation rate in the
current month. Based on this adaptive-expectation formulation, I treat the actual inflation
rate in the current month as the expected inflation rate in the following month.
The Canadian commodity price data consist of futures prices for canola oil and
feed wheat traded on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange (WGE) between 1982 and 2005. The
U.S. commodity price data consist of futures prices for corn, oats, soybeans, soybean
meal, soybean oil, and wheat traded on the Chicago Board of Trade
(CBOT/CMEGROUP) and spring wheat traded on the Minneapolis Grain Exchange
(MGEX). I obtain the data of individual commodity futures prices (on a daily frequency)
A weighted average of the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar against a subset of
the broad index currencies that circulate widely outside the country of issue. Major
currencies index includes the Euro Area, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, Switzerland,
Australia, and Sweden.
5
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from the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB). For each commodity, the futures prices
are from futures contracts of varying maturities; these contracts may overlap at a moment
in time. To compile the time series of commodity future prices, I use only the prices from
the nearby future contract. In particular, beginning from the first day of the study period,
I use the prices from the nearest maturing contract until the last day of that contract (i.e.,
the day when the maturity month is reached). Then, I use the prices from the next nearest
maturing contract. Repeating this until the last day of the study period, I construct the
time series of each commodity’s futures price.
For each commodity, the difference of commodity futures prices between the
opening price on the day when the inflation rate is announced (once every month) and the
closing price on the day before the new inflation rate is announced is the measure of the
change of the commodity futures price for that month; this measure gauges how the
market responds to the announcement of the inflation shock. In general, the opening price
is the individual commodity futures price at 10:30am Eastern Time on the trading day on
the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange for Canada and the Chicago Board of Trade and the
Minneapolis Grain Exchange for the US; the closing price is the individual commodity
futures price at 2:15pm Eastern Time the day before. I obtain the inflation-rate release
(announcement) dates from Statistics Canada and the US Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics. The monthly release dates of inflation rate are almost always different
for each country. Both Canada and the U.S. release CPI data at 8:30am Eastern Time,
which is two hours before the starting time of commodity futures trading. Within this
time (2 hours), I reason the market has enough time to respond to the announcement of
inflation—a response reflected in the opening prices of commodities—and little else.
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I obtain the data on foreign exchange rates from the Federal Reserve Economic
Database (FRED) at the daily frequency. The Canada / U.S. and the U.S. / Canada
foreign exchange rates are used for Canada and the U.S., respectively. The Canada / U.S.
and the U.S. / Canada foreign exchange rate are noon buying rates in New York City for
cable transfers payable in foreign currencies. The noon rates are calculated to reflect the
trades that take place between 11:59 a.m. and 12:01 p.m. and are updated by about 12:45
p.m. ET at month-end and 12:30 p.m. ET on other business days, which is several hours
after the inflation release time (8:30am ET); again, I measure its daily changes in these
foreign exchange series in response to inflation shocks. Because the bulk of Canadian
foreign trade (exports and imports) is always with the United States, the focus of
attention for Canada is naturally the Canada / U.S. foreign exchange rate. I also use the
Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index (Major Currencies) to measure the changes of the
exchange rate for the U.S. The Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index is updated at about
16:30 p.m. ET, I also measure its daily changes in response to inflation shocks.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this chapter, I report estimation results based on the models I specified in
chapter 3. In addition, I present robustness checks to examine whether my model is
effective in terms of testing the relationship between the announcement of inflation
shocks and commodity and foreign-exchange prices.
4.1 The impact of announcements of inflation shocks on commodity and foreignexchange prices
I estimate the impact of inflation shocks on commodity and foreign-exchange
prices to explore whether the inflation shocks affect commodity and foreign-exchange
prices through the channel of real interest rates. In other words, if positive inflation
shocks result in negative commodity and foreign-exchange price changes through the
channel of higher real interest rates, then expected inflation is anchored; thus, the
inflation-targeting framework is credible.
In the case of Canada and the US, because the Bank of Canada explicitly adopted
an inflation-targeting framework while the Federal Reserve System did not, I hypothesize
that, after adopting its inflation-targeting framework, the Bank of Canada earned
credibility that the Federal Reserve System continued to lack. To test this hypothesis, I
estimate the effect of inflation shocks on commodity and foreign-exchange prices in
Canada and the United States over the period of 1982 to 2005. Additionally, to gain
insight into how monetary policy is perceived over time, I divide the sample period into
two distinct sub-periods representing different monetary policy regimes. The first period
is 1982 to 1991 and the second period is 1996 to 2005. I end the first sub period in 1991,
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when the Bank of Canada explicitly announced that it had adopted an inflation-targeting
framework for its monetary policy. However, the Canadian inflation-targeting framework
did not mature until early 1993 (Bernanke et al., 1999). So the two subsamples represent
pre-IT and post-IT policy regimes, respectively. As such, the two subsamples offer a
useful, natural experiment with which to compare monetary policies in the two countries
over time.
In order to investigate the response of commodity and foreign-exchange prices to
an inflation shock, I estimate regression equations of the form specified in Equation 28. I
structure the data so that the announcement of inflation takes place prior to the market’s
open, so the dependent variable ∆st is calculated as 100 times the difference between the
natural log of the opening price directly after the announcement of inflation and the
natural log of the closing price just prior to the announcement. In each month, the
inflation data are released at 8:30am Eastern Time, which is two hours earlier than the
market’s open (10:30am). So I assume the announcement effects of inflation shocks on
commodity futures prices and foreign exchange prices occur on the day when the actual
inflation rate is released. I also assume that, aside from the inflation announcement, no
other relevant information is released between the market close and the following day’s
open, or if other information is released it is of a random nature and, thus, captured by the
error term in my regression specification. Nevertheless, given the relatively small role
that inflation shocks play in shaping commodity price movements, I expect relatively low
R-squared estimates.
I calculate the inflation shock using Equation 33:
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∆π t = {[ln( CPI t , j ) − ln(CPI t −1, j )] *100 − [ln( CPI t , j −1 ) − ln(CPI t −1, j −1 )] *100} *100 (33)

where t represents the year, and j represents the month. In this equation, I use the actual
inflation rate of month (j-1) as the expected inflation rate for month j; thus, I assume
inflation expectations are adaptive.
Because the inflation rate is released on a specific day every month, I take the
commodity and foreign-exchange prices on that specific day and the prior day of each
month over the period 1982 to 2005, and then calculate first differences. For each asset
type and for Canada, there are 120 observations for the pre-IT period and 119
observations for the post-IT period. I omitted one observation on 2/22/2005 because the
closing price was not available. In Table 2, I present summary statistics for the dependent
variable—Canadian Commodities and exchange rate. The average refers to the average of
the percentage change of commodity and foreign exchange prices, and a negative
minimum value is a log value of a number less than one which means the opening price
on the inflation release day is lower than the closing price on the prior day. Here the
approximate equation ln(1 + a ) ≈ a is applied, and a represents the percentage change.
The same is applied to values reported in Table 4.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Canadian Commodities and exchange rate
Commodity

Period

average

standard
deviation

maximum minimum

1982-1991
0.014
0.717
3.312
1996-2005
-0.05
0.753
2.658
1982-1991
-0.065
1.1
4.492
Canola oil
1996-2005
0.048
0.73
2.413
-0.028
0.233
0.655
Canadian/US Dollar 1982-1991
Exchange Rate
1996-2005
0.081
0.447
1.385
Note: 119 observations for 1982-1991; 120 observations for 1996-2005
Wheat

-1.792
-2.301
-9.042
-2.744
-0.988
-1.124
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In Table 3, I report how commodity and foreign currency prices respond to
inflation shocks over the two periods for Canada.
Table 3: Estimated Effects of Inflation Shocks on Commodity and Foreign
Exchange Prices, Canada
Commodity

Period

Coefficient

t-statistic

P-value

R-squared

1982-1991

-0.001
(0.002)

-0.74

0.459

0.005

-0.005

-1.85**

0.068

0.028

Wheat
1996-2005
1982-1991
Canola oil
1996-2005
Canadian/US
Dollar
Exchange
Rate

1982-1991
1996-2005

(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.000
(0.001)

0.19

0.849

0.000

-1.61***

0.109

0.022

0.58

0.564

0.003

-0.004

-2.18*

0.031

0.039

(0.002)
Notes: * indicates significance of coefficient at the 5% level
**indicates significance of coefficient at the 10% level
(Standard errors are given in parentheses)
I also compute standard errors and the t-and P-values using the robust regression
method (i.e., regression with robust standard errors), and the results are almost
identical. This also applies to other regression results reported in this thesis.

The results in Table 3 indicate that, in the post-IT period, commodity prices
respond negatively and significantly to inflation shocks at the 10% and 11% level for
wheat and canola oil, respectively. In addition, the Canadian/US dollar exchange rate is
also significantly affected by inflation shocks at the 5% level in the post-IT period. In
comparison, there is no significant response in the pre-IT period, regardless of the sign of
the coefficients. This result, together with the observed (and theoretically substantiated)
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negative relationship between real commodity prices and real interest rates, provides
strong evidence that inflation shocks affected commodity and foreign-exchange prices
during the post-IT period primarily through the channel of the real interest rates instead
of the channel of expected inflation rates. In particular, in the post-IT period, market
participants perceived an inflation shock as a one-time event the central bank would
reverse, so they raised their expectations of the real interest rates and, consequently,
commodity and foreign-exchange prices fell below their long-run equilibriums until the
expected rise of each offset the higher expected real interest rate. The different response
of commodity and foreign-exchange prices to inflation shocks in the pre- and post-IT
periods indicates that expected inflation is well anchored in post-IT period, and I reason
this is because of the inflation-targeting framework. This in turn indicates that the
inflation-targeting framework is effective and the Bank of Canada gained credibility by
adopting it.
In order to compare the U.S. monetary policy effects with Canada, I test the
responses of commodity and foreign-exchange prices over the same time periods for the
U.S.: the pre-IT period from 1982 to 1991 and the post-IT period from 1996 to 2005. The
U.S. monetary experience offers a rich comparison in this case, because although the U.S.
settled on an implicit inflation-targeting framework by the late 1990s (Goodfiriend,
2005), it did not explicitly announce its adoption of an inflation-targeting framework.
Therefore, if an explicit inflation-targeting framework is uniquely effective, the Bank of
Canada should be more credible than the Federal Reserve in terms of safeguarding its
inflation target.
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In Table 4, I present summary statistics for the dependent variable—the U.S.
Commodities and exchange rates.
Table 4: Summary Statistics for US commodities and exchange rates
(120 observations for each period)
Commodity
Corn
Oats
Soybeans
Soybean Meal
Soybean Oil
Wheat(on CBOT)
Wheat(on
MGEX)
US/Canada
exchange rate
Trade Weighted
exchange rate

Period

average

standard
deviation

1982-1991
1996-2005
1982-1991

-0.032
0.201
0.139

2.619
1.277
2.139

5.754
6.236
6.175

-21.380
-3.624
-14.123

1996-2005

-0.167

3.098

6.236

-28.414

1982-1991
1996-2005
1982-1991
1996-2005
1982-1991
1996-2005
1982-1991
1996-2005
1982-1991
1996-2005
1982-1991
1996-2005
1982-1991
1996-2005

0.127
-0.061
0.162
-0.167
0.200
0.101
-0.062
0.118
-0.061
-0.067
0.012
0.005
-0.079
0.000

1.426
0.914
1.461
0.857
1.232
0.759
3.254
1.078
1.605
1.225
0.241
0.415
0.449
0.414

4.395
3.250
5.436
3.170
4.809
4.619
6.436
5.573
2.772
5.080
0.804
1.258
1.141
1.233

-8.173
-5.645
-6.723
-3.950
-5.293
-2.382
-32.757
-1.739
-14.944
-7.271
-0.863
-1.433
-1.463
-1.021

maximum minimum

In Tables 5 and 6, I report responses of U.S. commodity and foreign-exchange
prices over the periods of pre-IT and post-IT, respectively. Corresponding to the U.S.
inflation release dates, I calculate 120 observations for each commodity (14 commodities
in total) and foreign-exchange prices in the pre- and post-IT periods. As shown in Table
5, in the pre-IT period, the sign of the coefficients between the commodity and foreignexchange prices and inflation shocks are mixed and there are no significant relationships.
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Table 5: Estimated Effects of Inflation Shocks on Commodity and Foreign Exchange Prices
over the period 1982-1991, the U.S.
Commodity
Coefficient
t-statistic P-value R-squared
Corn/No.2 Yellow
-0.003 (0.010)
-0.32
0.753
0.001
6
Corn(Pit Only )
-0.003 (0.010)
-0.32
0.753
0.001
Oats/White Heavy
0.005 (0.008)
0.58
0.563
0.003
Oats(Pit Only)
0.005 (0.008)
0.58
0.563
0.003
Soybeans/No.1 Yellow
-0.001 (0.005)
-0.20
0.842
0.000
Soybeans(Pit Only)
-0.001 (0.005)
-0.20
0.842
0.000
Soybean Meal/48% Protein
0.001 (0.005)
0.10
0.919
0.000
Soybean Meal(Pit Only)
0.001 (0.005)
0.10
0.919
0.000
Soybean Oil/Crude
0.001 (0.004)
0.18
0.854
0.000
Soybean Oil(Pit Only)
-0.002 (0.004)
-0.36
0.722
0.001
Wheat/No.2 Soft Red
-0.006 (0.012)
-0.53
0.594
0.002
Wheat(Pit Only)
-0.006 (0.012)
-0.53
0.594
0.002
Wheat/Spring 14% Protein
-0.006 (0.006)
-0.97
0.333
0.008
Wheat, Spring(Pit Only)
-0.006 (0.006)
-0.97
0.333
0.008
US/Canada exchange rate
0.000 (0.001)
-0.33
0.745
0.001
Trade Weighted exchange rate
0.001 (0.002)
0.33
0.746
0.001
Note: Each commodity has 120 observations
(Standard errors are given in parentheses)

In Table 6, I report regression results for the post-IT period. Similar to the pre-IT
period, the responses of commodity and foreign-exchange prices to inflation shocks are
mixed (with both negative and positive coefficients). However, there are indeed a few (three
out of sixteen) commodities and exchange rates for which the coefficients are negative and
significant. For example, in the case of Soybean Meal (Pit Only), the coefficient is
significant at the 1% level, and a one-percentage increase in the inflation rate causes a 1.8%
decline in Soybean meal prices. In addition, the response of US/Canada exchange price is
also significant and negative at the 5% level, i.e., a one-percentage increase in the inflation

Pit only refers to the trading that occurs at a specific venue where buyers and sellers
communicate using open outcry method to communicate with each other, different from
what occurs in an electronic trading platform.

6
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rate causes a 0.7% decline in US/Canada exchange price. Those significantly negative
coefficients appear to be consistent with the effect of the inflation-targeting framework. This
could be explained by the change in monetary regimes from a dual mandate to maintain both
high employment and low and stable inflation to an implicit inflation-targeting framework
from the pre-period to the post-IT period.
Table 6: Estimated Effects of Inflation Shocks on Commodity and Foreign Exchange Prices
over the period 1996-2005, the U.S.
Commodity
Coefficient
t-statistic P-value R-squared
Corn/No.2 Yellow
0.016 (0.009)
1.76**
Corn(Pit Only)
0.005 (0.010)
0.47
Oats/White Heavy
-0.006 (0.025)
-0.23
Oats(Pit Only)
-0.017 (0.025)
-0.68
Soybeans/No.1 Yellow
0.007 (0.005)
1.34
Soybeans(Pit Only)
-0.008 (0.007)
-1.07
Soybean Meal/48% Protein
-0.009 (0.005)
-1.65**
Soybean Meal(Pit Only)
-0.018 (0.007)
-2.78*
Soybean Oil/Crude
0.004 (0.005)
0.72
Soybean Oil(Pit Only)
0.001 (0.006)
0.17
Wheat/No.2 Soft Red
0.012 (0.008)
1.54
Wheat(Pit Only)
0.009 (0.009)
1.10
Wheat/Spring 14% Protein
0.014 (0.009)
1.56
Wheat, Spring(Pit Only)
0.012 (0.010)
1.24
US/Canada exchange rate
-0.007 (0.003)
-2.05*
Trade Weighted exchange rate
-0.001 (0.003)
-0.24
Notes: * indicates significance of coefficient at the 5% level
** indicates significance of coefficient at the 10% level
Each commodity has 120 observations
(Standard errors are given in parentheses)

0.081
0.639
0.817
0.500
0.183
0.288
0.101
0.006
0.471
0.862
0.126
0.272
0.122
0.217
0.043
0.808

0.026
0.002
0.001
0.004
0.015
0.010
0.023
0.061
0.004
0.000
0.020
0.010
0.020
0.013
0.034
0.001

The pre-IT period of the US falls into the period when Paul Volcker was the
chairman of the Fed, and when the Fed had a credibility problem, which showed up as
“inflation scares”—sharply rising long-term bond rates reflecting long-term inflation
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expectations. Although the Volcker Fed had made some preemptive actions against
inflation, another “inflation scare” occurred in 1987 when stock market crashed near the
end of Volcker's term as the chairman of the Fed. In summer of 1987, Greenspan became
the Chairman of the Fed in place of Volcker. To overcome the 1987 stock market crash,
the Greenspan Fed took a series of policy actions to reverse the loss of Fed’s credibility
for low and stable inflation. In practice, the Greenspan Fed’s preemptive actions again
inflation can be viewed as the emergence of an implicit inflation-targeting policy regime.
Particularly, owing to the 1994 preemptive interest rate policy actions, inflation and
inflation expectations were anchored more firmly than ever before, and by 1996 the bond
rate was down to around 6 percent which was viewed as “the death of inflation”
(Goodfiriend, 2005). The change of the Fed’s credibility for low and stable inflation and
inflation expectations from the Volcker to Greenspan era may at least in part explain the
statistically significant and negative results that I obtained in the post-IT period.
Overall, there is no apparent difference between the response of the commodity
and foreign-exchange prices to inflation shocks in the pre- and post-IT periods for the
US, and thus there is less compelling evidence of a change (toward credibility) in the
markets’ perception about U.S. monetary policy. However, for the US, the switch of
responses in Soybean Meal and US/Canada exchange prices from insignificant in the preIT period to significantly negative in the post-IT period is consistent with the fact that the
Greenspan Fed gained credibility for low and stable inflation and, thus, low and stable
inflation expectations, thanks to the implicit inflation-targeting framework adopted by the
Greenspan Fed.
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4.2 Robustness tests of the model
To check the robustness of my methodology, I apply it to the U.S. experience
during the periods of November 3, 1978-October 4, 1979 and July 7, 1980-November 5,
1982, which Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) have examined. Between these two periods,
there was a monetary regime shift: the Fed (under the leadership of Paul Volcker)
announced a change in operating procedures on October 6, 1979 and imposed credit
controls from March to July 1980 in order to get the money growth rate under control.
The U.S. experienced a sharp increase in the level and volatility of inflation and inflation
expectation during 1970s, which resulted in a near total collapse of the Fed’s credibility
for low inflation. In 1979 when Volcker became the chairman of the Fed, the Volcker
Fed endeavored to get the inflation down and restore the Fed’s credibility for low
inflation. At that time, the Volcker Fed realized that it is difficult to disinflate if the fed
continued to make monetary policy by pursuing interest rate policy (target the federal
funds rate). Because if the Fed chose to increase the real interest rate to stabilize the
economy by raising the nominal interest rate, its efforts would need to be understood and
trusted by the public. However, having experienced the collapse of credibility, the public
could underestimate the Fed’s determination to bring down inflation. Hence, it was
difficult for the Fed to judge how a given nominal interest rate policy action would
translate into an adjustment of the real interest rate. Therefore, on October 6, 1979, under
Chairman Paul Volcker, the FOMC changed its monetary policy approach to target
money growth rates, which would allow interest rates to rise substantially and, thus, lean
against inflation pressures (Goodfiriend, 2005). Figure 5 shows inflation and nominal
interest rates around the period of the Volcker Fed, in which the Fed experienced a
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change in monetary operating procedure. From the picture, after July 1980 inflation starts
to decrease and, the trend of nominal interest rates is opposite to the trend of inflation.
The opposite trends reflect anchored inflation after 1980, which may be explained by the
change of monetary operating procedure.
Figure 5: Inflation and Nominal Interest Rates in the U.S., 1975-1985
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Given these new operating procedures and the Great Inflation that preceded them,
I hypothesize that in the pre-October 1979 period, commodities and foreign-exchange
prices were not responding negatively to positive inflation shocks. In contrast, I
hypothesize that in the post-July 1980 period, these prices did respond negatively to
inflation shocks, because the market believed in the Fed’s (credible) commitment to
achieve its preannounced money growth targets and, thus, disinflate. Indeed, the result of
Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) show that some (though not nearly all) responses of
commodities and foreign-exchange prices to money surprises—their measure of
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announcements of inflation—changed from no significant relationship to negatively
significant from the pre-October 1979 to the post-July 1980 period.
Using my approach, I find a similar switch of responses to inflation shocks (as I
measure them) of commodities and foreign-exchange prices, as shown in Tables 7 and 8.
In particular, in the pre-October 1979 period, the responses reveal no clear sign pattern,
whereas in the post-July 1980 period, the responses are negative except for two wheat
series exchanged in MGEX (Wheat/Spring 14% Protein and Wheat, Spring (Pit Only))
and the Trade weighted exchange rate that positively reacts to inflation shocks. It is
interesting to note that the response of US/Canada exchange prices switch from an
insignificant positive coefficient of 0.004 to a significant negative coefficient of -0.001.
This result is similar to Frankel’s result of for the Canadian dollar, for which the response
switches from an insignificantly negative coefficient of -0.011 to a significantly negative
coefficient of -0.077. Although Frankel’s results in post-July 1980 period are all negative,
only a few cases (gold, cattle, the Swiss franc and Canadian dollar) are statistically
significant at 5% level. The general consistency between my test results and that of
Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) for the same period suggests that my method used to test
the credibility of central bank is meaningful.
Table 7: Estimated Effects of Inflation Shocks on Commodity and Foreign Exchange
Prices over the period 11/3/1978-10/4/1979, the U.S.
RCommodity
Coefficient
t-statistic P-value
squared
Corn/No.2 Yellow
0.001
(0.005)
0.14
0.893
0.002
Corn(Pit Only)
0.001
0.14
0.893
0.002
(0.005)
Oats/White Heavy
-0.013
(0.008)
-1.54
0.158
0.209
Oats(Pit Only)
-0.013
(0.008)
-1.54
0.158
0.209
Soybeans/No.1 Yellow
0.001
(0.003)
0.24
0.815
0.006
Soybeans(Pit Only)
0.001
(0.003)
0.24
0.815
0.006
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Soybean Meal/48% Protein
0.000
(0.003)
Soybean Meal(Pit Only)
0.000
(0.003)
Soybean Oil/Crude
0.000
(0.007)
Soybean Oil(Pit Only)
0.000
(0.007)
Wheat/No.2 Soft Red
-0.010
(0.005)
Wheat(Pit Only)
-0.010
(0.005)
Wheat/Spring 14% Protein
-0.004
(0.003)
Wheat, Spring(Pit Only)
-0.004
(0.003)
US/Canada exchange rate
0.004
(0.003)
Trade Weighted exchange
-0.002
(0.003)
rate
Note: Each commodity has 11 observations
(Standard errors are given in parentheses)

0.03
0.03
0.02
0.02
-2.06
-2.06
-1.54
-1.54
1.28

0.975
0.975
0.981
0.981
0.070
0.070
0.158
0.158
0.233

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.320
0.320
0.208
0.208
0.154

-0.76

0.469

0.060

Table 8: Estimated Effects of Inflation Shocks on Commodity and Foreign Exchange
Prices over the period 7/7/1980-11/5/1982, the U.S.
RCommodity
Coefficient
t-statistic P-value
squared
Corn/No.2 Yellow
-0.004 (0.005)
-0.76
0.456
0.022
Corn(Pit Only)
-0.004 (0.005)
-0.76
0.456
0.022
Oats/White Heavy
-0.001 (0.008)
-0.14
0.892
0.001
Oats(Pit Only)
-0.001 (0.008)
-0.14
0.892
0.001
Soybeans/No.1 Yellow
-0.001 (0.003)
-0.39
0.703
0.006
Soybeans(Pit Only)
-0.001 (0.003)
-0.39
0.703
0.006
Soybean Meal/48% Protein
-0.003 (0.002)
-1.11
0.279
0.045
Soybean Meal(Pit Only)
-0.003 (0.002)
-1.11
0.279
0.045
Soybean Oil/Crude
-0.002 (0.003)
-0.90
0.375
0.030
Soybean Oil(Pit Only)
-0.002 (0.003)
-0.90
0.375
0.030
Wheat/No.2 Soft Red
-0.001 (0.004)
-0.22
0.826
0.002
Wheat(Pit Only)
-0.001 (0.004)
-0.22
0.826
0.002
Wheat/Spring 14% Protein
0.001
(0.002)
0.47
0.645
0.008
Wheat, Spring(Pit Only)
0.001
(0.002)
0.44
0.661
0.008
**
US/Canada exchange rate
-0.001 (0.001)
-1.78
0.086
0.109
Trade Weighted exchange rate
0.003
(0.001)
2.34*
0.027
0.174
Note: * indicates significance of coefficient at the 5% level
** indicates significance of coefficient at the 10% level
Each commodity has 28 observations
(Standard errors are given in parentheses)
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In summary, I examine the responses of commodity and foreign-exchange prices
to inflation shocks in the period of 1982 to 2005 for Canada and the U.S. For Canada, the
responses of commodity and foreign-exchange prices to inflation shocks changed from
effectively zero to negative from the period of 1982 to 1991 to 1996 to 2005, consistent
with the expected result of the adoption of an inflation-targeting framework by the Bank
of Canada in 1991. By adopting the framework, the Bank of Canada could better and
more credibly maintain low and stable inflation. In comparison, the response of
commodity and foreign-exchange prices to inflation shocks shows no clear sign pattern
and, has only changed in a few cases from the period of 1982 to 1991 to 1996 to 2005 for
the U.S. This change is not as strong as Canada. This is not a surprise, because the U.S.
did not explicitly adopt the inflation-targeting framework. However, the changes in the
cases of Soybean Meal and US/Canada exchange prices I study suggest that the Fed has
earned some credibility for low inflation due to its adoption of an implicit inflation-target
framework during 1996 to 2005. The comparison between the two sub-periods for
Canada, as well as that between Canada and the U.S., provides strong evidence that the
inflation-targeting framework is effective and, the central bank that explicitly adopts it
should be more credible than the one does not.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
In the early 1990s, the Bank of Canada explicitly adopted an inflation-targeting
framework for monetary policy, while the Federal Reserve did not. Instead, the Federal
Reserve seemed to settle on an implicit inflation-targeting framework, at least until the
late 1990s. In this study, I test whether the Bank of Canada achieved credibility for low
and stable inflation because it adopted an explicit inflation-targeting framework and,
likewise, whether the Federal Reserve achieved credibility for low and stable inflation
because it adopted an implicit inflation-targeting framework.
To measure central bank credibility, I estimate how commodity and foreignexchange prices respond in Canada and the United States to announcements of inflation
shocks over the period of 1982 to 2005. Additionally, to gain insight into how monetary
policy is perceived over time, I divide the sample period into two distinct sub-periods
representing different monetary policy regimes: 1982 to 1991 represents the pre-IT policy
regime and 1996 to 2005 represents the post-IT policy regime—explicit or otherwise.
The responses of commodity and foreign-exchange prices to inflation shocks
reflect whether the market’s inflation expectations are anchored, which in turn reflects
central bank credibility for low and stable inflation. Specifically, commodity and foreignexchange prices fall in response to a positive inflation shock if the market interprets the
shock as a one-off event the central bank will reverse. This is because the market reasons
that the central bank is credibly committed to its inflation target; thus, the market expects
the central bank to raise real interest rates to get the inflation rate back on target. In this
case, expected inflation is unchanged. The higher expected real interest rates make the
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cost of storing commodities and foreign currencies higher and, thus, investors shift out of
commodities and foreign currencies and into money; this shift drives down commodity
and foreign-exchange prices. In contrast, commodity and foreign-exchange prices rise in
response to a positive inflation shock if the market interprets the shock as a new, looser
monetary policy stance. Because the central bank does not demonstrate credibility, the
market adjusts its expectations of inflation upward in face of inflation shocks; the
expected real interest rate is unchanged. The higher expectations of inflation induce
investors to shift into commodities and foreign currencies and out of interest earning
financial assets and, thus drive up commodity and foreign-exchange prices. In summary,
commodity and foreign-exchange prices negatively respond to inflation shocks if the
central bank is credible, because in this case the expected real interest rate rises while
expected inflation is anchored. Whereas, commodity and foreign-exchange prices
positively respond to inflation shocks if the central bank is not credible, because in this
case the expected real interest rate is unchanged and expected inflation is revised upward.
My results indicate that, for Canada, there is no significant response of
commodity and foreign-exchange prices to the announcements of inflation shocks in the
pre-IT period, regardless of the sign of the coefficients. In comparison, all the commodity
and foreign-exchange prices respond negatively and significantly to the announcements
of inflation shocks in the post-IT period. That is, in the post-IT period, market
participants perceived an inflation shock as a one-time event the central bank would
reverse, so they raised their expectations of real interest rates without changing their
expectations of inflation and, consequently, commodity and foreign-exchange prices fell
according to the observed negative relationship between real commodity prices and real
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interest rates. The different responses of commodity and foreign-exchange prices to
inflation shocks in the pre- and post-IT periods indicate that expected inflation is well
anchored in the post-IT period but not in the pre-IT period. The anchored expected
inflation reflects that the Bank of Canada achieved credibility since its adoption of
inflation-targeting. So I conclude that Canada’s inflation-targeting framework amounts to
a credible commitment to low and stable inflation.
For the US, in the pre-IT period, the sign of the coefficients between the
commodity and foreign-exchange prices and the inflation shocks are mixed (with both
negative and positive coefficients) and there are no statistically significant relationships.
Similar to the pre-IT period, in the post-IT period, the responses of commodity and
foreign-exchange prices to the announcements of inflation shocks are still mixed and,
have only changed in a few cases from the sub-period of pre-IT to post-IT and the change
is not as strong as Canada. This is not a surprise because the U.S. did not explicitly adopt
an inflation-targeting framework. However, in the post-IT period, there are indeed a few
(three out of sixteen) commodities and foreign-exchange prices for which the coefficients
are negative and significant. Those significantly negative coefficients appear to be
consistent with the effect of the Fed’s implicit inflation-targeting framework. The switch
of responses from insignificant to significantly negative could be explained by the change
of the Fed’s monetary regime from a dual mandate to maintain both high employment
and low and stable inflation to an implicit inflation-targeting framework from the preperiod to the post-IT period.
Overall, the results of this study support my working hypothesis that by adopting
an inflation-targeting framework for monetary policy, the Bank of Canada achieved a
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relatively high degree of credibility in terms of maintaining low and stable inflation both
relative to its past and relative to the Federal Reserve, which did not explicitly adopt an
inflation-targeting framework (during my sample period). The comparison between the
two sub-periods for Canada, as well as that between Canada and the U.S. provides strong
evidence that the inflation-targeting framework is effective and, the central bank that
explicitly adopts as a monetary policy framework should be more credible than the one
does not.
In addition, I test the robustness of my model by applying the same method to the
U.S. during the periods of November 3, 1978 to October 4, 1979 and July 7,1980 to
November 5, 1982 that Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) examined. Between these two
periods, there was a monetary regime shift: the FOMC (under the leadership of Paul
Volcker) changed its monetary policy approach from targeting the federal funds rate to
targeting the money growth rate, which was then thought to be a better approach to
controlling inflation. Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) find that the responses of
commodities and foreign-exchange prices to money surprises—their measure of
announcements of inflation—changed from no significant relationship to negatively
significant from the pre-October 1979 to the post-July 1980 period. Using my approach,
I find a similar switch of responses to inflation shocks (as I measure them) of
commodities and foreign-exchange prices. The general consistency between my test
result and that of Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) for the same period suggests that my
method used to test the central bank credibility is effective.
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Appendix I: Derivation of α
Equation 25 is derived as follows.

L = E[απ 2 + (1 − α ) y 2 ]

( 21)

π t = −λrt + ε t

(22)

yt = − ( rt +

1

ω

εt )

( 23 )

rt = zε t

( 24)

Substituting Equation 24 into Equations 22 and 23 and taking the variances of inflation
and output yields Equation 30 and 31.

σ π2 = (1 − λz ) 2 σ ε2

(30)

1

σ y2 = ( z + ) 2 σ ε2
ω

(31)

Substituting these expressions into Equation 21 yields Equation 32.

1
L = α[(1 − λz ) 2σ ε2 ] + (1 − α )[(z + ) 2 σ ε2 ]

(32)

ω

Minimizing Equation 32 with respect to z yields z =

αλ − (1 − α )

1

ω.
αλ2 + (1 − α )

Finally, substituting the expression for z into Equations 30 and 31 yields Equation 25.
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Appendix II: Data Specification

Country

Canada

Variables

Frequency

Source

Long-term interest rates

monthly

OECD - MEI

Core CPI inflation1

monthly

OECD - MEI

Commodity price index

monthly

Bank of Canada

CPI release dates

monthly

Statistics Canada

Commodity futures
price

daily

CRB InfoTech CD Futures

1/197112/2007
1/197112/2007
1/197212/2007
1/198212/2005
1/198212/2005

Canada / U.S. Foreign
Exchange Rate2

daily

Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System

1/198212/2005

Long-term interest rates

monthly

OECD - MEI

Core CPI inflation

monthly

OECD - MEI

Producer price index

monthly

CPI release dates

monthly

US

Commodity futures
price
Trade Weighted U.S.
Dollar Index: Major
Currencies3

1

daily
daily

U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics
U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics
CRB InfoTech CD Futures
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System

Sample Size

1/197112/2007
1/197112/2007
1/197212/2007
1/198212/2005
1/198212/2005
1/198212/2005

Consumer prices - Annual inflation, all items non-food non-energy

Canadian Dollars to One U.S. Dollar, Noon buying rates in New York City for cable
transfers payable in foreign currencies.
2

A weighted average of the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar against a subset of
the broad index currencies that circulate widely outside the country of issue. Major
currencies index includes the Euro Area, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, Switzerland,
Australia, and Sweden.

3
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Appendix III: Commodity Futures Characteristics

Symbol

Commodity

Exchange1

Trading Hours (E.S.T.)2

WC

Canola / No. 1

WCE

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

WW

Wheat, Domestic Feed/No. 3

WCE

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

C-

Corn / No. 2 Yellow

CBOT/CMEGROUP

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

2C

Corn (Pit Only)

CBOT/CMEGROUP

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

O-

Oats / White Heavy

CBOT/CMEGROUP

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

2O

Oats (Pit Only)

CBOT/CMEGROUP

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

S-

Soybeans / No. 1 Yellow

CBOT/CMEGROUP

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

2S

Soybeans (Pit Only)

CBOT/CMEGROUP

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

SM

Soybean Meal / 48% Protein

CBOT/CMEGROUP

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

2L

Soybean Meal (Pit Only)

CBOT/CMEGROUP

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

BO

Soybean Oil / Crude

CBOT/CMEGROUP

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

2B

Soybean Oil (Pit Only)

CBOT/CMEGROUP

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

W-

Wheat / No. 2 Soft Red

CBOT/CMEGROUP

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

2W

Wheat (Pit Only)

CBOT/CMEGROUP

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

MW

Wheat / Spring 14% Protein

MGEX

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

2M

Wheat, Spring (Pit Only)

MGEX

10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m.

WCE, Winnipeg Commodity Exchange; CBOT/CMEGROUP, Chicago Board of
Trade; MGEX, Minneapolis Grain Exchange.

1

2

Trading hours quoted are as before 2006.

